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The Use of International Finance Subsidiaries in the
Netherlands Antilles
By Ronald G. Hock*
The use of the international finance subsidiary (IFS) as a means of
obtaining investment capital began in response to a 1960's foreign invest-
ment program designed to correct the United States balance of payments
deficit.' By facilitating the flow of capital into the United States, and
impeding the flow of capital out of the United States, the program
prompted the international tax bar into developing new techniques for
reaching the "tainted" overseas capital markets. While the balance of
payments program has largely been dismantled, the IFS continues to be
a valuable means of access to the vast reservoir of investment capital
located overseas, particularly in the Eurobond market. 2
The primary purpose of an IFS is to enable its domestic parent cor-
poration to borrow overseas at a cost lower than that which would be
available domestically. 3 Because the existing United States regulatory
scheme may exempt overseas lenders from withholding tax on the inter-
* B.S. 1980, State University of New York at Albany; J.D. 1983, Duke University School
of Law. LL.M. Taxation, New York University, expected May 1984. The author wishes to
acknowledge Professor Pamela B. Gann, Duke University School of Law, who sponsored the
independent study out of which this article grew.
Bittel, Offshore Fziancingfor United States Business Ventures, 48 IND. L.J. 43, 57-59 (1972).
The program consisted of the following steps:
1. Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, 76 Stat. 960, 1006-27 (codified as amended
at I.R.C. §§ 951-964 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)) (eliminating deferral of income tax on
some offshore profits, whether or not repatriated).
2. Interest Equalization Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 88-563, 78 Stat. 809 (1963) (codified as
amended at I.R.C. §§ 4911-4920 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)) (placing a tax on the
purchase of certain foreign securities and debt obligations).
3. Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-809, 80 Stat. 1539 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of I.R.C.) (providing inducements for offshore investors
to invest in the United States).
4. Foreign Direct Investment Regulations, 15 C.F.R. §§ 1000.101-.1407 (1974) (repealed
1976) (restricting offshore investments by U.S. persons).
5. Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114,
1122-23 (1970) (providing for reporting of all international money transactions involv-
ing more than $5000).
2 Gelinas, Tax Considerations for US. Corporations Using Finance Subsidiaries to Borrow Funds
Abroad 7 J. CORP. TAX'N 230, 231 nn.2,3 (1980). For an in-depth discussion of the Eurobond
market, see Newburg, Financing in the Euromarket by US Companies.- A Survey ofthe Legal and Regu-
lator Framework, 33 Bus. LAw. 2171, 2178-84 (1978).
3 This statement is true provided U.S. interest rates are higher than foreign interest rates.
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.est they receive, 4 their after-tax yield will increase, and the nominal in-
terest rate they demand from ultimate United States borrowers will
decrease correspondingly. 5
The recent downward trend in U.S. interest rates has lessened the advantage of borrowing
overseas. See Gelinas, supra note 2, at 231.
A secondary purpose for creating an IFS is to avoid the strict registration requirements of
U.S. securities law. See generally L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 159-708 (1961). These re-
quirements apply to "trade or commerce in securities ... among the several States or between
• ..any Territory of the United States and any State or other Territory, or between any foreign
country and any State [or] Territory." Securities Act of 1933, § 2(7), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(7) (1982).
See also id. § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982). Exemption from registration under U.S. securities law
can thus be attained by taking careful steps to assure that no securities will be sold to a U.S.
beneficial owner. For a more complete discussion of the procedures which will cause the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission to issue "no-action" letters, see Newburg, supra note 2, at 2186.
Other purposes for creating an IFS include early redemption and other options not avail-
able for borrowings of comparable maturities in the U.S. market, debt covenants that are more
flexible than those required for comparable U.S. obligations, greater speed in completing the
offering, and acquisition of foreign currency. See Gelinas, supra note 2, at 231 n.3.
4 The following excerpt from the offering circular of Beatrice Foods Overseas Finance
N.V., April 26, 1978, is typical of a Netherlands Antilles issuance:
In the opinion of United States counsel for Overseas and Beatrice, under
present United States Federal income tax law and under the terms of the present
Income Tax Convention between the United States of America and the Kingdom
of the Netherlands, as extended to the Netherlands Antilles, interest paid by
Overseas will be exempt from United States Federal income tax unless the recipi-
ent is a citizen, resident or corporation of the United States and . . . under pres-
ent United States Federal estate tax law, the Notes will not be subject to United
States Federal estate tax if held by persons who are not residents or citizens of the
United States at the time of death.
No rulings have been requested from the United States Internal Revenue
Service because the Internal Revenue Service is no longer willing to issue rulings
with respect to the question of whether obligations of "finance subsidiaries," such
as the Notes, constitute the indebtedness of such a subsidiary. In September 1974,
the Internal Revenue Service published a ruling which stated that "the mere
existence of a five to one debt to equity ratio. . . should no longer be relied upon
as a basis for concluding that debt obligations of a finance subsidiary constitute
its own indebtedness, and it revoked certain published rulings (including those
referred to below) that reached such a conclusion where there was such a debt to
equity ratio.
In rendering such opinion, United States counsel for Overseas and Beatrice
has relied on the Internal Revenue Service's administrative interpretation of the
law, evidenced by published rulings of general applicability and private rulings
with respect to specific obligations, including outstanding obligations of Overseas.
The opinion of counsel is also based on representations by Overseas and Beatrice
with respect to the assets, liabilities and income of Overseas, including a represen-
tation that the value of Overseas' equity capital at the time the Notes are issued
will be at least $62,000,000. It is the intention of Overseas and Beatrice that
Overseas will operate in accordance with such representations.
Id. at 30, reprinted in Lederman, The Qffshore Fiance Subsidiay." An Analysis of the Current Benefits and
Problems, 51 J. TAX'N 86, 87 n.2 (1979).
5 When a parent corporation contemplates the raising of investment capital through cre-
ation of a finance subsidiary, it must make a key planning decision: whether to utilize an IFS or
a domestic finance subsidiary (DFS). Use of a DFS is limited by I.R.C. § 861 (1976 & Supp. V
1981), which states that in order to be exempt from U.S. witholding tax on interest paid to
nonresidents, a U.S. corporation must derive less than 20% of its gross income from U.S. sources.
If the DFS will invest the loan proceeds in foreign subsidiaries or affiliates, the customary course
of action is organizing a DFS (typically in Delaware) to issue the securities. Where a substantial
part of the loan proceeds will be invested in domestic operations, a DFS is unlikely to have
sufficient foreign source income to meet the § 861 test. In such a case, the use of an IFS is
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Recent IFS bond issues have exhibited the following general
pattern:
The exemption of the foreign bond holders from U.S. withholding tax is
sought to be accomplished by the parent forming an offshore finance
subsidiary. That subsidiary issues bonds to foreigners, and in turn on-
loans the bond issue proceeds to the U.S. parent. It is expected by the
U.S. parent that no U.S. withholding tax will be imposed on the interest
paid by the U.S. parent to the offshore finance subsidiary, assuming the
offshore finance subsidiary is incorporated in a country with a treaty
providing an exemption from U.S. withholding tax on U.S. corporate
interest income. It is also expected that no U.S. withholding tax will be
imposed on interest paid by the offshore finance subsidiary to its foreign
bondholders.
6
The first part of this article enumerates the terms of a typical IFS
debt offering. The second part describes why the Netherlands Antilles
has developed into such a popular incorporation site for an IFS. The
third part discusses the desired tax treatment of a Netherlands Antilles
IFS financing scheme from the point of view of the respective parties
involved. The fourth part analyzes the weapons the Internal Revenue
Service has at its disposal to attack a questionable IFS arrangement, and
provides a contemporary example of such an attack. The fifth part dis-
closes the tax-avoidance problems posed by the use of the IFS from the
standpoint of the Treasury of the United States and the means it has
proposed to combat these problems in the future. Finally, the paper con-
cludes that the ultimate tax treatment of Netherlands Antilles IFSs will
depend upon the resolution of conflicting policy considerations relating
to the flow of investment capital in an out of the United States.
I. Typical Terms of an IFS Debt Offering
An IFS debt offering, in order to be marketable, must be structured
to satisfy the objectives of the foreign lenders, as well as those of the U.S.
parent corporation and the IFS. Typically, the debt offering includes the
following terms:
1. The bonds will be issued in bearer form, with the person
presenting the coupons or the bond itself at maturity receiving
payment. V
2. The bonds will be issued in denominations of one thousand
United States dollars, normally at a seven and one-half to ten
percent fixed rate of interest, but occasionally at a floating rate
established by a fixed margin above the London Inter-Bank Of-
fered Rate (LIBOR).
3. Payments of interest and principal on the bonds will be fully
guaranteed by the United States parent corporation.
advisable. See Newburg, supra note 2, at 2189-90. This article assumes that most of the loan
proceeds will flow to domestic operations, so that use of an IFS will be most appropriate.
6 Lederman, supra note 4, at 86.
1983]
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
4. Both the U.S. parent corporation and the IFS will indemnify
the foreign bond holders for any U.S. withholding tax liability
imposed.
5. The bonds will be callable by the IFS if the Internal Revenue
Service imposes withholding tax liability upon interest pay-
ments and may be callable by the IFS if, after five years, interest
rates have fallen by a certain amount.
6. The bonds may be convertible into the United States parent
corporation's stock.
7. The bonds will be registered for trading on a European securi-
ties exchange, typically the Luxembourg or London exchanges.
8. The bonds will be distributed by foreign underwriters. 7
II. Advantages of the Netherlands Antilles
A United States parent corporation willing to enter the overseas
capital market will prefer the most favorable conditions possible for its
IFS. Accordingly, a so-called "tax haven" will usually be chosen as the
incorporation site of the IFS. While a tax haven is not easily defined, one
commentator has offered the following definition: "any piece of ground
which is above sea level at low tide, and which has no need for Internal
Revenue." This definition, although overbroad, captures the essence of
a tax haven as it relates to the use of an IFS - a jurisdiction which
confers tax benefits upon an IFS which would not ordinarily be available
to its parent corporation in its country of residence.
The Netherlands Antilles may, at present, be the most suitable of
the tax havens used as an incorporation site for an IFS9 due to the fol-
7 See Gelinas, supra note 2, at 232; Lederman, supra note 4, at 86.
8 The Use of Ofhore Tax Havens for the Jrpose of Evading Income Taxes: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., ist Sess. 2 (1979) (state-
ment of M. Carr Ferguson).
9 The difficulty in defining a tax haven makes identifying existing tax havens even more
difficult. The Internal Revenue Service Tax Audit Guidelines now provide a non-exclusive list
of thirty tax haven countries. The countries listed are:
1. Antigua 16. Isle of Man
2. ,Austria 17. Liberia
3. Bahamas 18. Liechtenstein
4. Bahrain 19. Luxembourg
5. Barbados 20. Monaco
6. Belize 21. Nguru
7. Bermuda 22. The Netherlands
8. British Virgin Islands 23. The Netherlands Antilles
9. Cayman Islands 24. Vanuatu (formerly New Hebrides)
10. Costa Rica 25. Panama
11. Channels Islands 26. Singapore
12. Gibralter 27. St. Kitts
13. Grenada 28. St. Vincent
14. Hong Kong 29. Switzerland
15. Ireland 30. Turks and Caicos Islands
Internal Revenue Manual, Part IV, exhibit 500-13. See Green, Current Developments, 8 INT'L TAx
J. 291, 291-92 (1982).
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lowing characteristics: '0
1. unobtrusive currency and exchange controls;
2. efficient communication and transportation systems;
3. political and economic stability;
4. well-developed banking and legal systems;
5. relatively low income tax rates to the IFS;
6. absence of estate or inheritance taxes on the value of Nether-
lands Antilles debt obligations held by non-residents;
7. bank secrecy laws which permit a high degree of confidentiality
for foreigners transacting business;
8. freedom from withholding taxes on payments of interest to for-
eign lenders on Netherlands Antilles debt obligations; and
9. favorable tax treatment for IFSs of United States parent corpo-
rations as the result of a tax treaty with the United States."
The main reason United States parent corporations find the Nether-
lands Antilles to be a popular incorporation site is undoubtedly the ap-
plicability of the United States-Netherlands Income Tax Convention, as
extended by protocol to the Netherlands Antilles. 12 Articles XII and
VIII contain two major advantages of the treaty.
Under Article XII, provided the recipient is not a citizen, resident,
or corporation of the United States, interest paid by a Netherlands Antil-
les corporation is exempt from United States withholding tax, whether or
not the IFS is deemed to be engaged in a trade or business within the
United States.1 3 Under Article VIII, provided the interest income is not
effectively connected with a permanent establishment in the United
States, interest received by a Netherlands Antilles IFS from its United
States parent corporation will be exempt from United States income
tax. 14 This characterization should be avoided if the IFS has no offices
in the United States, the loan to the United States parent corporation
was made in the Netherlands Antilles, and if two additional conditions
are satisfied. First, assuming that the IFS will be lending the proceeds of
o See Dimitruk, Setting Up a Netherlands Antilles Company, in FOREIGN TAX HAVENS 125
(Prac. L. Inst. 2d ed. 1974); Kanter, The Netherlands Antilles, in FOREIGN TAX HAVENS (Prac. L.
Inst. 1973). See generally Boffa, Internatonal Finance Subsidiaries, 215 TAX MGMT. (BNA) A-14 (2d
ed. 1972); Curacao Int'l Trust Co. N.V., Netherlands Antilles, in GRUNDY'S TAX HAVENS 126
(M. Grundy 3d ed. 1974).
I1 Double Taxation Convention, Apr. 29, 1948, United States-Netherlands, 62 Stat. 1757,
T.I.A.S. No. 1855 [hereinafter cited as Netherlands Treaty]; Supplementary Protocol, June 15,
1955, United States-Netherlands, 6 U.S.T. 3696, T.I.A.S. No. 3366 [hereinafter cited as 1955
Protocol]; Supplementary Protocol, Oct. 23, 1963, United States-Netherlands, 15 U.S.T. 1900,
T.I.A.S. No. 5665 [hereinafter cited as 1963 Protocol].
12 Netherlands Treaty, supra note 11; 1955 Protocol, supra note 11; 1963 Protocol, supra
note 11. The U.S.-Netherlands Antilles treaty is currently being renegotiated, and the uncer-
tainty surrounding the negotiations has been reflected in the capital market. See infa notes 107-
25 and accompanying text.
13 Netherlands Treaty, supra note 11, art. XII, 62 Stat. 1757, 1762, T.I.A.S. No. 1855.
14 Netherlands Treaty, supra note 11, art. VIII, 62 Stat. 1757, 1761 T.I.A.S. No. 1855. See
Treaty Reg. § 505.304(b) (1983).
1983]
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its debt offering to the United States as opposed to foreign affiliates, the
IFS must elect to be taxed on its United States source income at the full
Netherlands Antilles corporate tax rates (24-30 percent),1 5 rather than at
the extremely favorable investment or holding company rates (2.4-3.0
percent).16 Second, assuming that the interest payments on the IFS debt
issue are not being paid to foreign banks, a favorable tax ruling is re-
quired from the local tax authorities in order for the IFS to be able to
deduct its payments of interest for the purposes of determining its
Netherlands Antilles taxable income. Such a ruling should be granted
provided the IFS has a net taxable income of at least one percent of the
first eighty million dollars principal amount of its outstanding issue, and
the bonds are listed on a recognized securities exchange.1 7
III. Desired Tax Treatment
Analysis of the United States tax treatment of an IFS financing
scheme involves both statutory and treaty considerations. This analysis
will proceed from the standpoint of the respective parties involved - the
United States parent corporation, the Netherlands Antilles IFS, and the
foreign lenders.
A. United States Parent Corporation
The United States parent corporation will be able to deduct the
interest it pays to its Netherlands Antilles IFS as an ordinary and neces-
sary business expense.' The IFS will prepare a Form 1001 claiming the
applicability of treaty Article VIII, and enabling the United States par-
ent corporation to make its interest payments to its IFS without with-
holding any tax.' 9
Assuming that the Netherlands Antilles IFS is a controlled foreign
corporation,20 the United States parent corporation must include in cur-
rent income its pro rata share of the IFS's earnings and profits under the
15 Landsverordening op de Winstbelasting 1940, art. 15 (Netherlands Antilles) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Lands. Winst.], reprintedt CORPORATE TAXATION IN THE NETHERLANDS ANTILLES
69 (A. Amador & F. Leo trans. 1978) [hereinafter cited as A. Amador & F. Leo].
16 Lands. Winst., supra note 15, art. 14, reprinted in A. Amador & F. Leo, supra note 15, at
48-60; 1963 Protocol, supra note 11, art. 1(1), 15 U.S.T. 1900, 1901-02, T.I.A.S. No. 5665.
17 Lands. Winst., supra note 15, art. 6(c), reprnthed in A. Amador & F. Leo, supra note 15, at
19-21. See Gelinas, supra note 2, at 241.
18 I.R.C. § 162(a) (1976) ("[Olrdinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred . . . in
carrying on any trade or business" are deductible); id. § 163(a) (1976) (interest paid on indebt-
edness is deductible). The IFS may, however, be unable to deduct separately the interest it pays
on its debt by foreign lenders. See infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
19 Treas. Reg. § 1.441-6, 26 C.F.R. § 1.1441-6 (1983).
20 A foreign corporation will be deemed a "controlled foreign corporation" (CFC) if more
than 50% of its voting stock is owned by "United States shareholders" on any day during its
taxable year. I.R.C. § 957(a) (1976). For this purpose, a "United States shareholder" is a U.S.
"person" owning 10% or more of a corporation's voting stock. I.R.C. §§ 951(b), 957(d) (1976).
In addition, stock held by parties related to a shareholder (i.e. family members, corporations,
partnerships, trusts and estates), may be considered constructively owned by the shareholder.
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Subpart F and investment in United States property rules.2 1 This
amount will typically equal the spread between the interest the IFS re-
ceives from its United States parent corporation and the interest it pays
to its foreign bondholders, less Netherlands Antilles taxes and other
expenses. 22
The United States parent corporation may gross-up and credit
against its United States tax liability the Netherlands Antilles income tax
I.R.C. §§ 985, 318 (1976 & West Supp. 1983). See generally D. TILLINGHAST, TAX ASPECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 174-79 (1978).
An intriguing concept in this area is that of the group finance subsidiary. Essentially, a
group of similarly situated seekers of investment capital may form an IFS which avoids CFC
status, and thus avoids the loss of income recognition deferral associated with CFC status. This
concept is discussed more fully in Gilburn & White, Tax Aspects of International Financing Opera-
tions, 6 TAX PLAN. INT'L 209-12 (1979); Reiner, Using Tax Havens Can Save US Tax on Foreign
Operations of Corporations, Individuals, 23 TAX'N FOR ACcT. 240, 241 (1979).
21 Under the Subpart F rules, if a foreign corporation is a CFC for an uninterrupted
period of thirty days or more during any taxable year, each of its United States shareholders
owning stock on the last day in such year must generally include in gross income its pro rata
share of the CFC's "Subpart F income" for the year. I.R.C. § 951(a) (1976). Subpart F income
equals the sum of:
1. Income derived from the insurance of United States risks, see I.R.C. § 953 (1976);
2. Foreign base company income, including foreign personal holding company income,
foreign base company sales income, foreign base company services income, foreign base
company shipping income, and foreign base company oil related income, see I.R.C.
§ 954 (1976);
3. International boycott income, see I.R.C. § 999; and
4. Amounts of illegal bribes, kickbacks, or other payments paid by or on behalf of the
CFC directly or indirectly to any government's officials, employees, or agents.
I.R.C. § 952(a) (1976).
The amount of Subpart F income a United States shareholder must include in gross in-
come is reduced by dividends received from the CFC and is limited by its pro rata share of the
CFC's earnings and profits. I.R.C. §§ 951(a)(2), 952(c) (1976). If less than ten percent of the
total gross income of a CFC is of a character which would give rise to Subpart F income, none
of the corporation's income will be taxable under Subpart F. I.R.C. § 954(b)(3)(A) (1976). For
a more complete discussion of the Subpart F rules, see D. TILLINGHAST, Supra note 20, at 174-79.
Under the investment in United States property rules, if a foreign corporation is a CFC for
an uninterrupted period of thirty days or more during any taxable year, each of its United
States shareholders owning stock on the last day in such year must generally include in gross
income its pro rata share of the CFC's increase in earnings invested in United States property
for the year. I.R.C. § 951(a)(l)(B). United States property is generally defined as properties
acquired after December 31, 1962, which are:
1. Tangible properties located in the United States;
2. Stocks of domestic corporations;
3. Obligations of United States persons; and
4. Rights to the use in the United States of: patents or copyrights; inventions, models, or
designs (whether or not patented); secret formulas or processes, or any other similar
property rights acquired or developed by the CFC for use in the United States. I.R.C.
§ 956(b) (1976).
The amount of the increase in earnings invested in United States property a United States
shareholder must include in gross income is reduced by previously taxed earnings and profits of
the CFC and is limited by the shareholders' pro rata share of the CFC's earnings and profits.
I.R.C. §§ 956(a), 959(a) (1976).
22 Reducing this spread to zero by equalizing the two interest rates is a tempting option.
However, the favorable tax ruling which must be obtained from Netherlands Antilles taxing
authorities before interest payments to non-bank, non-resident bondholders are deductible for
Netherlands Antilles tax purposes, as well as the negative IRS position on "back-to-back" loans,
effectively precludes this option. See itfra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
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paid by its IFS, assuming it is not in an excess foreign tax credit posi-
tion.23 In essence, the Netherlands Antilles income tax paid by the IFS
should result in no net cost to its United States parent corporation. In
addition, previously taxed earnings and profits of the IFS will incur no
further tax upon repatriation to the United States parent.2 4
Constructive Subpart F distributions25 should be classified as for-
eign source dividend income, as are actual dividends.26 This classifica-
tion effectively permits a United States parent corporation to raise its
overall foreign tax credit limitation in exchange for the income gross-up
associated with the constructive dividend.2 7 In addition, this classifica-
tion renders the IFS a source converter, converting the parent corpora-
tion's interest expense into United States source interest income of the
IFS, and back into foreign source dividend income of the United States
parent.
23 United States taxpayers may generally credit against their U.S. income tax due the
amount of foreign income tax directly payable. (FTC) I.R.C. § 901 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
Creditable taxes are defined as income, war profits, and excess profits taxes, and taxes "in lieu
of" income, war profits, and excess profits taxes. I.R.C. §§ 901(b)(1), 903 (1976).
In addition, a domestic corporation which owns at least ten percent of the voting stock of a
foreign corporation from which it receives dividends in any year shall be deemed to have paid
the proportion of any foreign income, war profits, or excess profits taxes paid or deemed paid by
such foreign corporation as the amount of such dividends bears to the accumulated profits of
such foreign corporation (out of which such dividends were paid) in excess of such income, war
profits, and excess profits taxes (other than those deemed paid). (IFTC) I.R.C. § 902(a) (1976).
The domestic corporation must gross-up its income by treating such "deemed paid" tax as a
constructive dividend (notwithstanding its inclusion of actual dividends received) by the foreign
corporation before being allowed the indirect credit against U.S. tax due. I.R.C. § 78 (1976).
The amount of foreign tax credit (both FTC and IFTC) allowable against U.S. tax due is
limited to the proportion of total U.S. income tax due which the domestic corporation's taxable
income from sources without the United States bears to the domestic .corporation's worldwide
taxable income, such fraction not to exceed 1.0. I.R.C. § 904(a) (1976). To the extent that
creditable taxes exceed this limit, the excess may be carried back two years and forward five
years, in that order, and to the extent the carried-to year's § 904 limit is not exceeded. I.R.C.
§ 904(c) (1976).
Domestic corporations not electing the foreign tax credit may deduct foreign income tax
due from their U.S. taxable income. I.R.C. § 904(c) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Corporations
electing the foreign tax credit may not deduct foreign taxes due from their U.S. taxable income.
I.R.C. § 275(a)(4) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
The IRS has specifically ruled that the foreign tax credit applies to Netherlands Antilles
income tax payable. See Rev. Rul. 65-16, 1965-1 C.B. 626.
For a more complete discussion of the foreign tax credit, see Dale, The Reformed Foreign Tax
Credit.4 Path Through the Maze, 33 TAX. L. REV. 175 (1978); Geen & Schreyer, Foreign Ta
Credit-Qualifwation and Computation, 5 TAx MGMT. (BNA) (4th ed. 1979).
24 I.R.C. § 959(a) (1976).
25 A constructive Subpart F distribution occurs when a U.S. shareholder of an IFS in-
cludes in his gross income his pro rata share of the IFS's income from investment in U.S. real
property. See I.R.C. § 951(a)(1)(B) (1976). See also supra note 21.
26 Treas. Reg. § 1.960-1(h), 26 C.F.R. § 1.960-1(h)(1983). See also U.S. Internal Rev.
Serv., Instructions to Form 1118, Schedule A (1983).
27 Thus, the "receipt" of the constructive dividend itself should not cause the U.S. parent
corporation's overall foreign tax credit limitation to be exceeded.
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B. International Fnance Subsidiary
Under treaty Article VIII, the IFS will not be liable for United
States withholding tax on the interest it receives from its United States
parent corporation. 28 Such a result will be permitted provided the pay-
ments are not effectively connected with a permanent establishment in
the United States.29 The IFS should then seek to minimize its United
States contacts.
Local law permits a Netherlands Antilles corporation which holds
only securities to elect to be taxed on its net investment income at invest-
ment or holding company rates (2.4-3.0 percent), rather than at custom-
ary corporate rates (24-30 percent). 30 However, Article I(1) of the
United States-Netherlands Antilles Protocol denies the exemption from
withholding on the interest paid by the U.S. parent corporation to its
IFS if the IFS elects to be treated as an investment or holding com-
pany.3 1 Accordingly, the IFS should not elect investment or holding
company treatment.
The loss of such an election should not have an adverse economic
impact upon a contemplated IFS financing arrangement. First, while
the United States withholding tax would have been based on the gross
interest income of the IFS, the Netherlands Antilles income tax will be
based on the net income of the IFS.3 2 Second, while the United States
withholding tax would not have been creditable to the United States
parent corporation, the Netherlands Antilles income tax paid by the IFS
will be.33 Assuming the United States parent corporation is not in an
excess foreign tax credit position, the Netherlands Antilles income tax
paid by the IFS will be cost-free to the group.
C Foreign Lenders
The foreign holder of the debt obligations of an IFS should not in-
cur any United States tax liability. First, interest payments by the IFS to
the foreign holders will constitute foreign source income. This will be
true even though the interest income of the IFS is treated as wholly non-
effectively connected United States source income.34 Accordingly, the
interest received by the foreign lender will be subject to neither United
States withholding tax35 nor withholding at the source.36 Second, testa-
28 Netherlands Treaty, supra note 11, art. VIII, 62 Stat. 1757, 1761, T.I.A.S. No. 1855.
29 Id. art. VII(l), 62 Stat. 1757, 1761, T.I.A.S. No. 1855.
30 Lands. Winst., supra note 15, art. 14, reprtnted tn A. Amador & F. Leo, supra note 15, at
19-21.
31 1963 Protocol, supra note 11, art. I, 15 U.S.T. 1900, 1901, T.I.A.S. No. 5665.
32 Lands. Winst.,supra note 15, art. 4, reprintedin A. Amador & F. Leo, supra note 15, at 15.
33 See I.R.C. § 901 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); Netherlands Treaty, supra note 11, art. XIX, 62
Stat. 1757, 1764-65, T.I.A.S. No. 1855.
34 I.R.C. §§ 862(a)(1), 861(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). See also Id. §§ 862(a)(2),
861(a)(2)(B) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (same rule applied to dividends).
35 See I.R.C. §§ 871(a)(1), 881(a)(1) (1976).
36 Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-3(a) (1960); Netherlands Treaty, supra note 11, art. XII, 62 Stat.
1757, 1762, T.I.A.S. No. 1825.
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mentary transfers by foreign holders of debt obligations of an IFS will
not be subject to estate tax in the United States.37
IV. Potential Attacks Upon Questionable IFS Arrangements
Achieving the significant benefits an IFS has to offer is not without
risk. The Internal Revenue Service, as "sergeant-at-arms" of the United
States Treasury, has at its disposal several statutory and judicially-cre-
ated means of attack with which to undermine an IFS financing
arrangement.3 8
A. Dzregard of the Corporate Entity
An IFS which exists in form only is subject to attack as a "sham"
entity. An often-quoted version of the doctrine of corporate entity was
expressed by the United States Supreme Court in Mohhe Properties, Inc. v.
Commissioner,39 as follows:
The doctrine of corporate entity fills a useful purpose in business life.
Whether the purpose be to gain an advantage under the law of the state
of incorporation or to avoid or to comply with the demands of creditors
or to serve the creator's personal or undisclosed convenience, so long as
that purpose is the equivalent of business activity or is followed by the
carrying on of business by the corporation, the corporation remains a
separate taxable entity. 4°
Such a rendition lends support to one commentator's assertion that
"[t]he quantum of business activity required is unclear, but the cases in-
dicate that it may be very small."'4 ' The floor of activity required of an
entity appears to have been enumerated by the Second Circuit in National
Investors Corp. v. Hoey:42
[Case law] declares that to be a separate jural person for purposes of
taxation, a corporation must engage in some industrial, commercial, or
other activity besides avoiding taxation: in other words, that the term
"corporation" will be interpreted to mean a corporation which does
some "business" in the ordinary meaning; and that escaping taxation is
not "business" in the ordinary meaning.43
Under this formulation, a corporation must show that it is accom-
plishing some valid business result other than the avoidance of taxation.
Whether an IFS can satisfy this standard poses a factual inquiry, but one
which is capable of some general observation. On the one hand, it may
be said that an IFS performs no other significant function than to permit
its foreign bondholders to escape United States income and estate taxes.
37 Treas. Reg. § 20.2103-1 (1973); Treas. Reg. § 20.2105-1(u), 26 C.F.R. § 20.2105-1(u)
(1983).
38 See generally Gelinas, supra note 2, at 248-56; Lederman, supra note 4, at 88-90.
39 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
40 Id. at 438 (footnotes omitted).
41 R. Povell, International Finance Subsidiaries Under Attack 6 (Dec. 1, 1982)(unpub-
lished manuscript).
42 144 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1944).
43 Id. at 468.
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On the other hand, it may be argued that the IFS serves as a bona fide
borrowing/lending entity which happens to be able to raise funds more
cheaply than similarly situated United States entities. 44 Arms-length
dealing between the parent corporation and the IFS would further the
latter argument. In any event, care should be taken by all concerned
parties to ensure that the IFS is treated as a genuinely functioning formal
entity.
4 5
Particularly relevant to this factual inquiry are the decided cases
which recognize the "separateness" of a corporation where use of the cor-
poration is dictated by the wishes of ultimate lenders to a transaction.4
6
These cases indicate that corporations created for the primary purpose of
facilitating lending transactions serve a valid business purpose. In addi-
tion, other decided cases involving foreign corporations seem to have ap-
plied standards similar to those applied in the domestic corporation
context.4
7
B. Thin Capitalization
An IFS which holds as assets solely the debt obligations of its United
States parent corporation will surely be attacked on undercapitalization
grounds. 48  The consequences of a successful attack would be a
recharacterization of the debt obligations of the IFS as those of its par-
ent, and a denial of the withholding exemption on payments of interest
to the IFS.
When the Interest Equalization Tax was in force, the IRS customa-
rily ruled that an IFS debt-equity ratio not greater than five to one
would suffice to characterize the bonds held by foreign lenders as the
bona fide debt of the IFS, and not of its United States parent corpora-
tion.4 9 When the Interest Equalization Tax expired in 1974, however,
the IRS revoked its prior rulings which had granted this safe harbor.
50
44 This argument should also apply to group finance subsidiaries. See supra note 20.
45 Observance of corporate formalities furthers this goal. Examples of steps which may
profitably be undertaken include maintaining a separate office, bank account, and adequate
books and records, hiring separate employees, holding required meetings, and filing appropriate
tax returns.
46 Collins v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 17 (D.C. Ga. 1974), a'dper cua;am, 514 F. 2d 1282
(5th Cir. 1975); Paymer v. Comm'r, 150 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1945); Strong v. Comm'r, 66 T.C. 12
(1976), aff'dmem. 39 A.F.T.R. 2d (P-H) 77-934 (2d Cir. 1977); Rogers v. Comm'r, 1975 T.C.M.
(P-H) 175,289.
47 Bass v. Comm'r, 50 T.C. 595 (1968); Ross Glove Co. v. Comm'r, 60 T.C. 569 (1973);
Siegel v. Comm'r, 45 T.C. 566 (1966).
48 See Plantation Patterns, Inc. v. Comm'r, 462 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1972). But see Santa
Anita Consol., Inc. v. Comm'r, 50 T.C. 536 (1968).
49 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 73-110, 1973-1 C.B. 454; Rev. Rul. 69-501, 1969-2 C.B. 233. The
Interest Equalization Tax, I.R.C. §§ 4911-4920 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (expired 1974), was a
tax imposed upon the acquisition by a United States person of stock or debt obligations of a
foreign corporation. The tax did not apply if immediately after the acquisition the acquiror
owned ten percent or more of the foreign corporation. Id. § 4905(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975)
(expired 1974).
50 Rev. Rul. 74-464, 1974-2 C.B. 46.
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At present, most IFSs have undertaken to maintain more conserva-
tive debt-equity ratios.5' However, the customary practice of the IFS
relending its equity to other affiliates of the United States parent corpo-
ration creates additional risk. 52 On the one hand, such relending may be
equated to a reduction of the United States parent corporation's invest-
ment in the IFS, resulting in a corresponding increase in the debt-equity
ratio. On the other hand, such relending may further the argument that
the IFS was merely acting in furtherance of its existing trade or business
as a bona fide borrowing/lending entity. 53
Maintaining an adequate debt-equity ratio should not be trouble-
some, however, even when, for business reasons, the IFS relends its equity
to other affiliates of the United States parent corporation. Pursuant to
one method which has been sanctioned by the IRS in private rulings and
implicitly approved in a published ruling,54 the parent or other affiliate
in need of funds may obtain a loan from a foreign bank, and use the
proceeds to make an equity contribution to the IFS. The IFS would then
deposit the funds in a time account with the foreign bank that had made
the original loan. The IRS has approved this method of financing under
circumstances where the right of the IFS to withdraw from the time ac-
count is not contingent upon the repayment of the original loan and the
deposit is not being used as collateral for the loan.
55
C Agency or Conduit
The IRS could seek to characterize the IFS as a mere agent or con-
51 Following are several examples of 1978 and 1979 issues by foreign subsidiaries and the
debt-equity ratios of each:
Amount Apparent
U.S. Parent of Incorporation of Issue Debt-Equity
Subsidiary Site of IFS ($ millions) Ratio of IFS
1978
Avco Netherlands Antilles 25 2.0
Beatrice Foods Netherlands Antilles 100 3.0
Coca Cola of N.Y. Netherlands Antilles 30 2.5
Hospital Corp. of America Netherlands Antilles 25 2.0
IG Industries Netherlands Antilles 35 2.0
tel Netherlands Antilles 25 2.5
J.C. Penney Netherlands Antilles 100 3.0
1979
Citicorp British Virgin Islands 100 3.0
Texas Int'l Airlines Netherlands Antilles 35 3.0
Sears Roebuck & Co. Netherlands Antilles 150 2.0
Gelinas, supra note 2, at 253 n.89.
52 Relending to U.S. affiliates of the U.S. parent corporation will trigger the application of
the investment in U.S. property rules, I.R.C. § 956 (1976), possibly creating additional current
taxable income to the U.S. parent corporation.
53 By lending funds to additional entities, the IFS would take on additional characteristics
of the group finance subsidiary. See supra note 20.
54 Se Rev. Rul. 69-501, 1969-2 C.B. 233. This ruling was revoked after the expiration of
the Interest Equalization tax, since it sanctioned a 5:1 debt-equity ratio. See supra note 49.
55 See Boffa, supra note 10, at A-14.
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duit of the United States parent corporation. Central to such a charac-
terization is a finding that the IFS financing arrangement constitutes in
reality nothing more than a "back-to-back" loan. The theory behind this
type of finding is that when the debt offerings of the parent corporation
and its IFS are compared to each other, and in light of the fact that the
United States parent has guaranteed payment of the obligations of the
IFS, their substantial similarity indicates that in substance only one debt
offering exists, the parent's, and that the IFS is acting as a mere interme-
diary between the true parties-in-interest.
In A'ken Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner,56 the IRS successfully attacked
a successive loan situation involving the use of an intermediary treaty
country IFS to avoid the imposition of United States withholding tax
upon the ultimate foreign lender. Because the rates of interest paid on
the successive debt offerings were identical, the court held that the ulti-
mate foreign lender, and not the treaty country IFS, had "received" the
interest paid by the United States parent corporation within the mean-
ing of the applicable treaty. Accordingly, the parent corporation was
held liable for the United States withholding tax which it had not with-
held from interest payments to its IFS. While Atken involved the transfer
of a pre-existing obligation to an after-created IFS, and is therefore dis-
tinguishable from the typical IFS financing arrangement, its rationale
would seem equally applicable to the typical arrangement.
In Rev. Rul. 72-514, 57 the intermediary lender was ignored where it
acknowledged that it was acting as a mere agent, that it had no in-
dependent risk of loss upon default of the ultimate borrower, and that
the interest rates on the two debt offerings were identical except for a
service fee. In Rev. Rul. 78-118,58 however, the IRS indicated that an
intermediary lender would be respected provided it had independent risk
of loss upon default of the ultimate borrower, it had substantial assets
other than the obligations of the ultimate borrower with which it could
absorb losses, and the rates of interest on the two successive offerings
were different.
D. Sham Transaction
Another position the IRS may take would concede the "separate-
ness" of the IFS entity, but disregard the form of the transaction on the
grounds that it is nothing more than a sham. To be successful with this
theory, the IRS must establish that the IFS arrangement in question was
devoid of economic substance, and that the taxpayer parent corporation
should be treated as though absolutely nothing had occurred. 59 Such a
56 56 T.C. 925 (1971).
57 Rev. Rul. 72-514, 1972-2 C.B. 440.
58 Rev. Rul. 78-118, 1978-1 C.B. 219.
59 See Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960); Goldstein v. Comm'r, 364 F.2d 734
(2d Cir. 1966).
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standard imposes a great burden on the IRS. A greater likelihood of
success might accompany a sham transaction variation of the agency or
conduit theory previously described. Such a theory would posit that
since the back-to-back loans are contained within a "single economic
family," they should be treated as direct borrowings of the parent
corporation.
60
E. United States Trade or Business or Permanent Establishment
The IRS may take the position that the IFS is engaged in a "U.S.
trade or business" under the Internal Revenue Code,6 1 or engaged in a
"U.S. trade or business" through a "permanent establishment" under the
United States-Netherlands Antilles treaty. 62 In either case, if the IRS
can successfully characterize the income of the IFS as effectively con-
nected with such trade or business, the IFS will be liable for regular
United States corporate income tax on its net interest spread.63 In addi-
tion, the Netherlands Antilles tax liability of the IFS would not be de-
ductible nor creditable in computing the net United States tax liability
of the IFS.
64
In Rev. Rul. 73-227,65 an IFS was deemed to be engaged in a trade
or business in the United States where it was not incorporated in a treaty
country, and where it maintained an office in the United States, per-
formed most of its clerical functions from that office, and made decisions
relating to the timing and placement of the borrowings of the IFS in the
United States. The ruling thus provides clear guidance as to the types of
United States contacts an IFS should seek to avoid.
F Exposure
The IRS may contend that the United States parent corporation's
agreement to indemnify the foreign holders of its IFS's obligations
against all IRS-imposed withholding taxes, interest, and penalties has
economic value, and may be equated to the payment of additional inter-
est. 66 In the event that the primary obligation to pay interest is subject
to the withholding tax, the effect of such a determination would be to
impose additional withholding requirements upon the United States par-
ent corporation based on this value.67
60 See Rev. Rul. 77-316, 1977-2 C.B. 53.
61 I.R.C. § 882 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
62 Netherlands Treaty, supra note 11, art. III, 62 Stat. 1757, 1759-60, T.I.A.S. No. 1855.
63 I.R.C. § 882 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); Netherlands Treaty, supra note 11, art. 111, 62 Stat.
1757, 1759-60, T.I.A.S. No. 1855.
64 I.R.C. § 906(b)(l)(B) (1976). See Treaty Regs. § 505.116, 26 C.F.R. § 505.116 (1983).
65 Rev. Rul. 73-227, 1973-1 C.B. 338.
66 See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-14(a) (1960). See also Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 279 U.S.
716 (1929).
67 Excluding interest and penalities, the U.S. parent corporation's theoretical U.S. with-
holding tax exposure is therefore approximately 43%, and not merely the statutory 30%, of the
interest payments. The computation to determine this theoretical exposure proceeds as follows:
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G. I R. C Section 482
Under I.R.C. section 482, the IRS has broad discretion to reallocate
income, deductions, and credits of related taxpayers in order to reflect
the true economic substance of business transactions between them.
68
While a detailed discussion of section 482 is beyond the scope of this
paper, it is enough to say that the myriad of ways the IRS may use the
section to its advantage could have a significant impact upon the United
States parent corporation's tax liability.
69
H. IR. C Section 269
Under I.R.C. section 269(a)(1), a United States parent corporation
which creates a subsidiary with the principal purpose of avoiding United
States income tax by securing an allowance not otherwise available, may
be subject to the loss of that allowance. 70 However, the technical ques-
tion presented as to whether section 269 even applies to IFS financing
arrangements, 7' coupled with the IRS' lack of reliance upon the section
in its past IFS rulings where it might have been applicable, 72 make it
unlikely that the IRS will invoke the section to challenge a withholding
tax exemption in the future.
I The Texas International Airhnes, Inc. Audit
The spectre of an IRS audit attack aided by one or more of the
above-described weapons looms large over each Netherlands Antilles IFS
financing arrangement. That spectre became reality for Texas Interna-
tional Airlines, Inc. in the spring of 1982, when the Houston district of-
fice of the IRS assessed a $1.2 million withholding tax deficiency against
the company based on two of its Netherlands Antilles IFS Eurodollar
borrowings. 73 Moreover,
[w]hile the $1.2-million deficiency which the Houston district office of
the IRS says the company owes may seem like a drop in the bucket in
what some say is a $50-billion market, investment bankers and tax spe-
cialists argue that the subsidiaries established by Texas International are
similar to hundreds of others now in place and that a popular and ex-
Where: x = theoretical U.S. withholding tax exposure
.30 = statutory U.S. withholding tax rate
x = .30(1 + x)
= .30 + .30x
.
70x = .30
x = .429
6 I.R.C. § 482 (1976).
69 For a general discussion of § 482, see Lewis, Allocations (See. 482) General Coverage, 327
TAX MGMT. (BNA) (1978).
70 I.R.C. § 269(a)(1) (1976).
71 An IFS financing arrangement reduces not the U.S. parent corporation's tax liability,
but the liability of the foreign bondholders.
72 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 79-65, 1979-1 C.B. 458; Rev. Rul. 69-377, 1962-2 C.B. 231.
73 See Closing a Loophole- Corporate Tax Haven in Netherlands Antilles is Bracing for a Disaster,
Wall St. J., Oct. 11, 1982, at 17, col. 2 [hereinafter cited as Closing a Loophole].
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panding source of financing is seriously threatened. 74
While details of the Texas International audit are unavailable,
sources have revealed the theories the IRS has used in its ongoing audit
of a similarly situated taxpayer. In this specific audit situation,
"[b]asically, the agent proposes to use Code Section 482 to allocate the
investment income earned by the subsidiary to the U.S. parent and to
use a 'conduit' theory to require withholding on the finance subsidiary's
interest payments." 75
In justifying an I.R.C. section 482 reallocation of income, the agent
appears to have relied upon what he initially perceived to be the follow-
ing factors: the finance subsidiary was located in the Netherlands Antilles
- a "tax haven"; the finance subsidiary had no employees; the finance
subsidiary incurred only nominal expenses; most of the negotiations for
the borrowing took place prior to the formation of the finance subsidiary;
nothing of importance was done in the Netherlands Antilles; the U.S.
parent guaranteed the obligation of the finance subsidiary; and the in-
vestment decisions of the finance subsidiary were made outside the
Netherlands Antilles. 76
The consequences of this section 482 reallocation are to recharacter-
ize the foreign source income of the IFS as United States source income
and, possibly, to make the Netherlands Antilles taxes paid on that in-
come not creditable. 77 The agent has indicated that competent author-
74 1982 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 169, at G-6 (Aug. 31, 1982).
75 Povell, supra note 41, at 16.
76 Id.
77 Where the Service reallocates income or expenses between related parties under
§ 482, and one of the parties has paid foreign taxes in respect of the income in
question, the creditability of the foreign taxes often is affected. In Rev. Rul. 72-
370, 1972-2 C.B. 437, a foreign subsidiary had paid foreign income tax. After
that foreign tax had been paid, the Service made adjustments under § 482, reallo-
cating certain income and expense items to the parent. Had those income and
expense items been allocated to the domestic parent ab indtio, the ruling posited,
neither the foreign subsidiary nor the parent would have been liable for a portion
of the foreign taxes actually paid by the foreign subsidiary. The ruling held that
a foreign tax credit was not allowable to the parent for the portion of the foreign
income tax that had been paid by the subsidiary upon the income that was reallo-
cated to the parent under § 482, on the ground that the parent was not directly
liable for the tax, and did not pay it or become subject to it. On the other hand,
the Service ruled in a companion ruling that where foreign corporation A paid
$100 of royalties to related foreign corporation B, from which it withheld $15 of
foreign tax, and the Service later reallocated the royalties to the domestic parent
of both corporations under § 482, the parent was allowed a foreign tax credit
under § 901 for the amount ($10) of foreign tax that would have been withheld
under applicable law. The tax was treated as having been paid by B on behalf of
the domestic parent. Rev. Rul. 72-371, 1972-2 C.B. 438.
In Rev. Rul. 74-158, 1974-1 C.B. 182 and Rev. Rul. 72-508, 1976-2 C.B. 225,
the Service illustrated the effect of a § 482 adjustment on the deemed-paid credit.
Under the rulings, the accumulated profits amount and the amount of foreign tax
used to compute the § 902 credit are to be recomputed by giving effect to the
Service's § 482 adjustment. If the § 482 adjustment would decrease the foreign
tax in question if the foreign government also gave effect to the adjustment, Rev.
Rul. 76-508 holds that the foreign tax must be recomputed on that basis, and
there is a presumption that the subsidiary has made a (noncreditable) contribu-
tion to the foreign government of the portion of the tax actually paid that is based
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ity relief pursuant to the United States-Netherlands Antilles treaty might
be available to resolve any resulting double taxation problem.
In supporting an Aiken-type conduit theory, which would essentially
ignore the role played by the IFS in the overall financing arrangement,
the agent relied upon the existence of the following factors:
1. the inadequate capitalization of the finance subsidiary;
2. the United States parent's guarantee of the finance subsidiary's
debt;
3. the lack of earnings history of the finance subsidiary;
4. the fact that most of the finance subsidiary's initial assets were
used to secure obligations of its United States parent and
affiliates;
5. the finance subsidiary's lack of assets not involved in the loan
transaction; and
6. the fact that thei finance subsidiary had no office and incurred
only nominal expenses. 78
The consequences of the application of this theory are to deny to the
United States parent corporation the chief benefit sought to be obtained
via the Netherlands Antilles IFS borrowing technique, or the withhold-
ing tax exemption pursuant to the United States-Netherlands Antilles
treaty on the interest payments made to foreign bondholders. In addi-
tion, the parent corporation may have to redeem the outstanding IFS
bonds in question, and obtain refinancing at the higher rates of interest
demanded in the domestic capital market.
Texas International Airlines, Inc. has not yet exhausted its adminis-
trative and judicial remedies. 79 While "[t]he history of these finance sub-
sidiaries indicates that Texas International will be successful in its
appeal,"8 0 the consequences of an affirmance of the Houston district of-
fice agent's audit report are grave indeed. For Texas International is not
alone in its audit difficulties with the IRS. "Present indications are that
not less than five and perhaps a significantly larger number of interna-
tional finance subsidiaries' situations are now the target of audit defi-
ciency assertions."'8 1 In addition, it has been speculated that the Texas
International subsidiaries "are similar to those of hundreds of other
on the income reallocated from the subsidiary to the parent. This presumption
can be rebutted if the subsidiary exhausts all effective and practicable remedies in
seeking a refund of the foreign taxes, and if the domestic parent exhausts its rights
under the competent authority procedure of any applicable treaty. An example
of a settlement between a foreign subsidiary and the local tax authorities that
rebutted this presumption is set forth in Rev. Rul. 77-267, 1977-2 C.B. 243.
Geen & Schreyer, Foreign Tax Credit-Qaifation and Computation, 5 TAX MGMT. (BNA) at A-8
(4th ed. 1979) (footnote omitted).
78 Povell, supra note 41, at 17.
79 See 1982 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 169, at G-7 (Aug. 31, 1982); Closing a Loophole,
supra note 73, at 1.
80 DAILY TAX REP., supra note 79, at G-7.
81 Povell, supra note 41, at i.
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Eurodollar issues."'8 2 A "domino effect," triggered by a negative opinion
against Texas International in its appeal, could result in the dislocation
of billions of dollars of outstanding IFS debt obligations and "cause a
total panic in the market."
8 3
j. Audit Prevention Techniques
It is easy to conclude that in order to minimize the likelihood of an
IRS attack upon its Eurodollar borrowing, a contemplated IFS should
avoid all of the negative factors which were relied upon by the IRS in
connection with the Texas International audit. In addition, an IFS
would be well served by adhering to the following general guidelines:
84
1. take all actions tending to formally evidence its separate corpo-
rate identity;
2. treat all of its assets and liabilities as its own;
3. engage in bona fide business activities;
4. maintain an appropriate debt-equity ratio;
5. make appropriate investments with its equity capital;
6. avoid making its equity capital available to its United States
parent corporation or other United States affiliates (if this be-
comes absolutely necessary, the services of an intermediary for-
eign bank should be used to provide funds indirectly);
7. deal at arms-length with its United States parent corporation;
and
8. avoid establishing a trade or business or permanent establish-
ment in the United States.
V. Tax Avoidance Problems from the United States Treasury
Standpoint
The definitive statement of the United States Treasury position con-
cerning the use of IFS financing arrangements appears to be contained
within a 1981 document which has come to be known as "The Gordon
Report."18 5 This report "was structured and its terminology chosen care-
82 DAILY TAX REP., supra note 79, at G-7.
83 Id.
84 This list is not exhaustive. For further discussion of these and other general guidelines,
see Povell, supra note 41, at 12-15.
85 R. GORDON, TAX HAVENS AND THEIR USE BY UNITED STATES TAXPAYERS - AN
OVERVIEW (1981). The cover letter accompanying the report, addressed to the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, the Assistant Attorney General (Tax Division), and the Assistant Secretary
of the Treasury (Tax Policy), describes the genesis and purpose of the report as follows:
You have asked that I review and advise you regarding the use of tax havens
by United States persons and present options to be considered for dealing with
problems created by that use.
In response to your request, I am pleased to submit the enclosed report which
is based on a study and analysis of tax haven transactions, United States internal
tax laws applicable thereto, United States income tax treaties, and the attempts
of the tax administrators to deal with these transactions.
[VOL. 9
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE SUBSIDIARIES
fully in order to dramatize the need for corrective measures" within the
existing tax haven regulatory framework. 86
The report begins by generally defining tax haven jurisdictions as
those which impose low rates of tax when compared with the United
States, and afford a high level of bank and commercial secrecy which
they refuse to breach even under an international agreement. 8 ' The re-
port then describes the different types of activities carried on by tax ha-
ven entities. These activities are classified into three categories -
legitimate, abusive, and evasive.
Legitimate transactions include those that are purely economically moti-
vated and those which, although tax motivated, do not violate the spirit
or letter of the tax law. Abusive transactions include those which take
advantage of some unintended loophole. Evasion is an action by which
a taxpayer seeks to escape tax liability by fraudulent means. 88
The report is naturally interested in curbing evasive and abusive
transactions. Into these categories the report classifies: 89
1. methods of structuring the stock ownership of a foreign corpora-
tion so that it will not constitute a Controlled Foreign Corpora-
tion under Subpart F of the Internal Revenue Code; 9°
2. the ownership of captive offshore insurance companies by small
groups of United States shareholders; 9 1
3. any arrangment which permits a nonresident of a tax haven to
create a corporation in a tax haven which then proceeds to re-
ceive some form of passive income with a minimum imposition
of tax;9
2
4. arrangements that allow tax haven corporations owned by
United States persons to engage in active business transactions
while avoiding the provisions of Subpart F;93 and
5. arrangements designed to conceal and/or launder the proceeds
It is this author's view that many of the positions taken in the report have been adopted by the
U.S. Treasury since its publication.
86 Franklin, Tax Havens - Problems With Continued Use, 40 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 33-1, 33-5
(1982).
87 R. GORDON, supra note 85, at 3.
88 Franklin, supra note 86, at 33-3.
89 See id. at 33-3 to 33-5.
90 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
91 A discussion of captive offshore insurance companies is beyond the scope of this article.
For a more detailed discussion of this topic, see O'Brien & Tung, Captive Offhore Insurance Corpo-
rations, 31 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 665 (1973).
92 The typical IFS financing arrangement discussed throughout this article falls into this
category.
93 The I.R.S. has recently issued a technical advice memorandum which takes an aggres-
sive position as to what constitutes Subpart F income. See I.R.S. Letter Ruling 8127017 (March
26, 1981) (Joint corporate officer of controlled foreign corporation (CFC) and its U.S. parent
provides substantial assistance to the performing of services by the CFC for the parent, so that
under I.R.C. § 954 (1976), income derived in connection with the.performance of such services
is Subpart F income).
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of fraudulent or criminal activities. 94
A. Recommendatzuns
The report then recommends a coordinated attack on the use of tax
havens in order to correct the above perceived abuses. The report recom-
mends, first, improvement in the coordination and funding of the admin-
istrative effort to deal with tax haven problems; second, substantive
changes in United States tax law; and third, changes in United States
treaty policy.
95
The principal administrative changes would be to modify existing
regulations or rulings to:
1. require that books and records of CFCs be maintained in the
United States;
2. improve guidelines under section 482 in order to ease adminis-
trative burdens placed on taxpayers and the Service and to
achieve greater certainty in pricing international transactions;
3. require withholding of tax on all payments of U.S. source fixed
or determinable annual or periodic income to foreign taxpayers
and to provide for payment of a refund upon the foreign
taxpayers filing of claim;
4. increase the taxpayer's burden of proof regarding proposed defi-
ciencies involving tax haven-related issues; and
5. deal with certain specific areas of "abuse" such as loans negoti-
ated by the domestic branch of a foreign bank but booked at
such bank's foreign office.
96
The principal legislative modifications suggested would:
1. amend Subpart F so as to tax all income of tax haven corpora-
tions controlled by United States taxpayers;
2. impose tax on all income of any foreign corporations managed
and controlled in the United States;
3. expand the definition of a CFC by diluting the "more-than-
fifty-percent" voting control test; and
4. impose a "no-fault" penalty on tax deficiencies relating to tax
haven transactions. 9 7
The principal modifications to the existing tax treaty structure
would be to:
1. terminate treaties with certain tax havens such as the Nether-
lands Antilles;
94 These types of arrangements are further explored in Blum, Offhore Money Flows: A Large
Dark Number, 35 J. INT'L AFF. 69 (1981).
95 See R. GORDON, supra note 85, at 10-13.
96 Franklin, supra note 86, at 33-6 (footnotes omitted).
97 Id. at 33-7 (footnotes omitted).
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2. insert strong exchange of information provisions into existing
and future treaties; and
3. insert into treaties provisions which prevent their use by so-
called "third country" residents. 98
B. Administrative Response
It is difficult to determine what projects are underway at the Treas-
ury Department to implement the administrative changes listed above.
Since the Government Accounting Office has recently recommended the
revision of the section 482 regulations, some momentum may be building
in favor of such a project.99 The Treasury Department does not appear
to favor the mandatory withholding-refund system. With that exception,
however, the Treasury Department can be expected to strive for the im-
plementation of all of the suggested reforms.
C Legislative Response
It is easier to measure the progress that has been made toward im-
plementation of the suggested legislative changes. Certain legislative
projects are underway which could have a significant impact upon the
use of IFS financing arrangements. The most significant legislative en-
actment since the publication of the Gordon Report has been the Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA). 1° ° The key pro-
vision of the Act,1"" section 342, calls on the United States Treasury to
issue regulations within two years "getting at the problem of unintended
parties taking advantage of tax treaties that allow for foreign investors to
avoid the thirty-percent withholding on interest." 10 2 The provision in-
cludes language requiring that a mandatory withholding system be con-
sidered, which the United States Treasury does not favor.'0 3 Significant
98 Id. at 33-9 (footnotes omitted).
99 See id. at 33-6 to 33-7.
100 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 92-248, 96 Stat. 324
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
101 An early version of TEFRA contained a provision which would have mandated
the registration of all securities with maturities greater than one year held by
foreign investors. Following a lobbying effort by the investment banking commu-
nity, the provision "was sufficiently watered down so as not to really be an imped-
iment at all." An exemption to the provision is now allowed "if the bonds are
issued under 'arrangements reasonably designed to ensure that they will be sold
or resold only to foreign persons.' "
1982 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 169, at G-6 (Aug. 31, 1982).
102 1982 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 194, at G-3 (Oct. 6, 1982).
103 The following remarks by Assistant Treasury Secretary for Tax Policy John Chapoton,
concerning a mandatory withholding-refund system, summarize the U.S. Treasury position as it
stands currently:
That idea has been proposed several times. We've concluded that it's not the best
way to go, but we certainly don't mind reviewing it again. My offhand reaction,
though, and I remember from my review of it, which was last year in connection
with a specific treaty, we concluded that it was not wise. I don't really remember
why now. Our policy decision is the negotiation of future treaties to prevent with
very strong, workable anti-abuse provisions to prevent the type of thing he (Rep.
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reasons include the possible negative impact on the flow of foreign capi-
tal into the United States due to the increased cost to foreign persons of
losing the use of funds while tax is being withheld on their interest pay-
ments, the ability of United States treaty partners to obtain residency
certification information, the possibility that these treaty partners would
"retaliate" by instituting a withholding system of their own, and in-
creased internal administrative burdens. 0 4
The legislative provision with perhaps the most far-reaching poten-
tial is H.R. 3025, which would repeal the thirty-percent withholding tax
on all foreign portfolio interest on foreign portfolio indebtedness. Origi-
nally introduced as H.R. 4618 by House Ways and Means Committee
members Rep. Conable (R-N.Y.) and Rep. Gibbons (D-Fla.), and sup-
ported by the Reagan Administration in early 1982, this bill must over-
come significant obstacles before it is enacted into law.'0 5
The legislature has recently begun to consider a partial repeal of the
withholding tax. A compromise plan which would reduce the withhold-
ing tax to about two and one-half percent is now pending in the Senate
Finance Committee as part of certain "add-on" provisions suggested by
its members for inclusion in Chairman Dole's (R-Kan.) deficit reduction
package.10 6 If treaty withholding rates were then adjusted to match the
Rosenthal) is concerned about, and he's also concerned not only about the lan-
guage of the treaty, but of the avoidance of the absolute language of the treaty.
So far, I don't think we've been convinced that that's a serious enough a problem
to take that dramatic a step. The point would be to actually change the provi-
sions so that the witholding occurs and then the refund procedure comes in. That
would mean obviously the loss of the capital to the parties and I just think that
we have not been convinced that in any instance that this is such a dramatic
problem.
1982 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 194, at G-3 (Oct. 6, 1982).
104 Id. at G-2.
105 Prior attempts to repeal the foreign withholding tax on foreign portfolio investments
have been met with little support. The original Conable-Gibbons bill, H.R. 4618, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1982), died when the second session of the 97th Congress adjourned in late 1982. The
bill has subsequently been reintroduced as H.R. 3025.
In addition,
In connection with the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the House Ways and Means
Committee reported a bill that included an elimination of withholding tax on
both interest and dividends except where paid to controlled foreign corporations
or where paid to 10 percent or greater shareholders by a U.S. person owned to the
extent of more that 50 percent by non-U.S. persons. This was rejected by the
House of Representatives. The Senate Finance Committee then reported a bill
that included an exemption limited to interest, but this narrower exception was
rejected by the Senate. On December 6, 1979, the Senate Finance Committee
reported another bill (H.R. 2297) containing a provision repealing the 30 percent
withholding tax on interest (including original issue discount) paid to nonresident
aliens and foreign corporations.
Gelinas, supra note 2, at 235 n. 19. H.R. 2297 died when the 96th Congress adjourned late in
1980.
Despite the lack of historical support for attempts to repeal the foreign withholding tax in
this area, yet another bill has been introduced. H.R. 4029, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), intro-
duced in late 1983 by Rep. Bernard (D-Ga), contains similar provisions. As of late January,
1984, the House had taken no action on either bill.
106 1983 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 249, at G-2 (Dec. 27, 1983).
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new statutory withholding rate, passage of the new provision would go
far to solve the "treaty shopping" problem as perceived by the Treasury.
D. Treaty Policy Response
The greatest possibility for rapid, dramatic change in the tax treat-
ment of the IFS lies in the area of treaty policy, for without the presence
of favorable tax treaties, IFS financing techniques would never have de-
veloped. In this realm, the United States Treasury can make policy rela-
tively unencumbered by the legislative process. 10 7 Accordingly, the
Treasury Department has recently initiated a bilateral attack upon the
tax treaties it considers abusive: first, it has developed two new Model
Treaty provisions designed to curb "treaty shopping" by third country
residents; and second, it has undertaken to renegotiate certain tax trea-
ties with the expectation that meaningful anti-abuse provisions will be
included.
E. Model Treaty Article 16
Since the release of the Gordon Report, the United States Treasury
has developed two distinct anti-treaty shopping provisions for use in tax
treaties both old and new.'10  The first of these provisions constitutes Ar-
ticle 16 of the Treasury Department's June 16, 1981 version of the Model
Income Tax Treaty, which reads as follows:
Article 16
Limitations on Benefits
1. A person (other than an individual) which is a resident of a Con-
tracting State shall not be entitled under this Convention to relief from
taxation in the other Contracting State unless:
(a) more than 75 percent of the beneficial interest in such person is
owned, directly or indirectly, by one or more individual residents of the
first-mentioned Contracting State; and
(b) the income of such person is not used in substantial part, di-
rectly or indirectly, to meet liabilities (including liabilities for interest or
royalties) to persons who are residents of a state other than a Con-
tracting State and who are not residents of the United States.
For the purposes of subparagraph (a), a company that has substantial
trading in its stock on a recognized exchange in a Contracting State is
presumed to be owned by individual residents of that Contracting State.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply if it is determined that the acquisi-
tion or maintenance of such person and the conduct of its operations did
107 The Senate, of course, must advise and consent to any treaty before it becomes effective.
See U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2.
108 The 1976 and 1977 Model Income Tax Treaties also included anti-treaty shopping pro-
visions. The U.S. Treasury is of the opinion that the two newest versions of the anti-treaty
shopping article are superior to the former provisions, however, and it is not likely that the
former provisions will be used in future treaty negotiations. See Freud, Treaty Shopping and the
1981 U.S Treasuy Model Income Tax Treaty, 1982 FOREIGN TAX PLANNING 37, 55 (1982). The
anti-treaty shopping article from the 1977 Model Treaty is reprinted in id. at 48.
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not have as a principal purpose obtaining benefits under the
Convention.
3. Any relief from tax provided by a Contracting State to a resident
of that other Contracting State under the Convention shall be inapplica-
ble to the extent that, under the law in force in that other State, the
income to which the relief relates bears significantly lower tax than simi-
lar income arising from within that other State derived by residents of
that other State. l9
This provision thus appears to be targeted directly at the use of IFS
financing arrangements. In essence, the provision would deny treaty
benefits to the typical Netherlands Antilles IFS assumed throughout this
paper. Moreover, unfortunately, the Treasury Department has not
seemed reluctant to insist on the inclusion of the article during the course
of renegotiating existing tax treaties, for the article was the basis for the
limitations on benefits clause, Article 17, introduced by protocol into the
United States-Jamaica Income Tax Treaty. 10
United States parent corporations which have either already estab-
lished IFSs, or which are contemplating doing so, will justifiably be con-
cerned over the Treasury Department's future treaty negotiation posture.
In other words, they will want to know whether the Treasury will "set-
tle" for any anti-treaty shopping provision other than the above Article
16 during the course of future treaty renegotiations, as an alternative to
the outright termination of the treaty. This question may have been an-
swered, at least in part, when the Treasury Department on December 28,
1981 issued a discussion draft of an alternative to the 1981 Model Income
Tax Treaty Article 16, which provides as follows:."1
Article 16
(discussion draft)
Limitations on Benefits
1. A corporation which is a resident of a Contracting State shall
not be entitled under this Convention to relief from taxation in the other
Contracting State with respect to an item of income, gains or profits
unless the corporation establishes that:
(a) its stock of any class is listed on an approved stock exchange in
a Contracting State, or that it is wholly owned, directly or through one
or more corporations each of which is a resident of a Contracting State,
by a corporation the stock of which any class is so listed; or
(b) it is not controlled by a person or persons who are not resi-
dents of a Contracting State, other than citizens of the United States; or
(c) it was not a principal purpose of the corporation or of the con-
duct of its business or of the acquisition or maintenance by it of the
shareholding or other property from which the income in question is
derived to obtain any of such benefits.
109 U.S. Treasury Dep't, Model Income Tax Treaty, art. 16, repninted in I TAX TREATIES
(CCH) 153 (1977).
110 See Income Tax Protocol, July 17, 1981, United States-Jamaica, art. III, - U.S.T.
T.I.A.S. No. 10207. See also Freud, supra note 108, at 50, 61-63.
111 U.S. Treasury Dep't, Discussion Draft of Article 16, Model Income Tax Treaty, reprinted
tn I TAx TREATIES (CCH) 152A (1982).
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2. For the purposes of this Article:
(a) an approved stock exchange in means
(b) an approved stock exchange in the United States means the
NASDAQ System owned by the National Association of Securities Deal-
ers, Inc. and any stock exchange registered with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission as a national securities exchange for the purposes of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
(c) a person or persons shall be treated as having control of a cor-
poration if under the income tax laws of the Contracting State in which
the income arises the person or persons could be treated as having direct
or indirect control of the corporation for any purpose;
(d) notwithstanding subparagraph (c) of this paragraph, a corpo-
ration is presumed to meet the requirements of subparagraph (b) of par-
agraph 1 of this Article if the corporation establishes that individuals
who are:
(i) citizens of the United States;
(ii) residents of a Contracting State; or
(iii) residents of States that have income tax conventions in
force with the Contracting State from which relief from taxation is
claimed and such conventions provide relief from taxation not less than
the relief from taxation claimed under this Convention; own directly
more than 75 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of
the corporation's stock entitled to vote and more than 75 percent of the
number of shares of each other class of the corporation's stock;
(e) a corporation is presumed to meet the requirements of subpar-
agraph (c) of paragraph 1 of this Article, in particular, where:
(i) the reduction in tax claimed is not greater than the tax
actually imposed by the Contracting State of which the corporation is
resident; or
(ii) the corporation is engaged in business operations in the
Contracting State of which it is a resident and the relief from taxation
claimed from the other Contracting State is with respect to income
which is incidental to or derived in connection with such business.
One writer has described this version of Article 16 as follows:
The discussion draft appears less restrictive than the 1981 draft
Model Treaty provision, in that the discussion draft applies only to cor-
porations, rather than to "persons," which would include other entities,
such as trusts and partnerships, and in that listing any class of stock on a
recognized exchange would suffice in aiding exemption from the appli-
cation of the discussion draft provision. It should also be noted that the
discussion draft provision does not apply to losses and sets forth objective
tests for determining whether a corporation is established for purposes of
treaty shopping, which appear slightly more liberal than those set forth
in the United States Income Tax Treaty with Jamaica.' 12
It appears, then, that the Treasury Department is willing to "settle"
for an anti-treaty shopping provision less stringent than the 1981 Model
Income Tax Treaty Article 16. Indeed, it seems that discussion draft
Article 16 was written with the express purpose of permitting the use of
IFS financing arrangements of the type contemplated in this paper to
112 Freud, supra note 108, at 54.
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continue without significant modification, if any. One pair of writers has
even gone so far as to state that "[i]t is readily apparent that the Treas-
ury Department is not concerned with abuse of tax treaties by subsidiar-
ies of U.S. public companies." '1 13 It then remains to be seen whether the
rationale behind discussion draft Article 16 represents a shift in policy
from the standpoint of the United States Treasury, and what effect the
provision will have upon future treaty negotiations.
F Current Treaty Negotiatins - The Netherlands Antilles
The recent flurry of treaty negotiation activity may be reflective of
an evolving Treasury Department policy concerning the availability of
treaty benefits through the use of existing treaties with so-called "tax ha-
ven" entities.'1 4 The United States-Netherlands Antilles treaty has been
113 Ruchelman & Imamura, Treaty Shopping: Proposed Article 16 of the United States Model
Income Tax Treaty, 9 TAx PLAN. INT'L. 3 (1982).
114 Current examples reflecting this evolving policy include negotiations with Jamaica, the
British Virgin Islands, Antigua, Guam, and Barbados.
Jamaica. As indicated supra, the anti-treaty shopping article of the United States-Jamaica
treaty was, in 1981, replaced by an article similar to article 16 of the 1981 Model Income Tax
Treaty. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. The adoption of this provision indicates an
aggressive Treasury Department bargaining posture, and a conciliatory Jamaican posture. The
new article virtually ensures that Jamaica will not be used as an incorporation site for the
typical IFS financing arrangement contemplated by this article. See generally Freud, supra note
108, at 50, 61-63.
British Virgin Islands. The United States-British Virgin Islands treaty was cancelled by the
Treasury Department in July, 1982, after British Virgin Islands officials refused to accept a
clause proposed by the United States which provided for a more open exchange of information
between the two countries involving business transactions in the islands. A State Department
spokesman explained that the British Virgin Islands "aren't being singled out .... This is
simply the first in a methodical attempt to wipe out tax avoidance by foreign investors." Wall
St. J., Oct. 11, 1982, at 1.
Antigua. Antigua terminated its income tax treaty with the United States, effective April 5,
1983. The treaty was virtually identical to the previously cancelled United States-British Virgin
Islands treaty. One reason for Antigua's cancellation of the treaty is its desire to capture a
larger share of the international financial and trading operations that have been lured to other
Caribbean islands:
[Slources close to the Antigua government said that island's parliament is ex-
pected to pass legislation within the next several weeks involving changes in its
taxation, banking, trust, insurance, and shipping laws in order to attract busi-
nesses to the newly independent nation. The eventual conversion of the island
into an off-shore financial center is designed to mirror the tax-free environment
now present in the Cayman Islands, Bermuda, and the Bahamas.
1982 DAILY TAx REP. (BNA) No. 218, at G-3 (Nov. 10, 1982). But "[t]he cancellation of the
treaty also could represent a feeling by island officials that the posture being taken by the U.S.
against treaty shopping . . . will scare business away from U.S. tax treaty partners." Id
Guam. Guam is a U.S. possession, and therefore has no tax treaty with the United States.
Under Guam's mirror internal revenue code, however, interest received by a Guam (or Virgin
Islands) corporation which derives most of its income from outside the possession is exempt from
withholding tax. See 1983 DAILY TAx REP. (BNA) No. 10, at G-3 (1983). This provision has
apparently turned Guam into a legitimate alternative as an IFS incorporation site. In response,
the IRS has issued interim regulations and revenue rulings designed to negate this possibility.
See T.D. 7865, 1983-2 I.R.B. 10; Rev. Rul. 83-9, 1983-2 I.R.B. 9 (applicable to Guam); Rev.
Rul. 83-10, 1983-2 I.R.B. 10 (applicable to the Virgin Islands). In essence, these regulations and
rulings consider income received by corporations in a possession to be U.S. source income if not
taxed by the possession. Any such income would then be deemed a direct payment from a U.S.
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in the process of renegotiation since September of 1982.115 Negotiators
from the two countries have met in several rounds of discussions, but
have yet to reach a final agreement" 6 on revisions to the treaty which
may prove to have a profound effect on the availability of the IFS bor-
rowing technique. Sources have indicated that "the areas where disa-
greement continues include the future of Eurodollar and other
investment financing through the Antilles and the exchange of informa-
tion relating to these investments between the Antilles government and
the United States Treasury Department."
'
"17
But sources have also indicated that the Treasury Department has
"offered a provision that would allow the subsidiaries of U.S. firms to
continue to offer debt on the Eurodollar market through the Antilles."' i8
It appears, then, that in exchange for its offer of discussion draft Article
16 or its substantial equivalent, the United States Treasury is demanding
the inclusion of an exchange of information provision undoubtedly simi-
lar to the provision which was responsible for the termination of at least
one prior treaty.' 9 It also appears that Netherlands Antilles officials
"are balking at the inclusion of such a provision in the existing tax
treaty."120
One commentator has noted that "anonymity is a crucial require-
ment of the foreign investors who comprise the Eurobond market," and
that IFS debt obligations which are issued in bearer form "in effect guar-
antee the foreign investors this anonymity."' 12 1 While this form of argu-
ment was successful in defeating the early TEFRA provision which
would have required the registration of all securities held by foreign in-
vestors with maturities of greater than one year, it does not appear that
the Treasury Department will be as sympathetic as the United States
Congress. Indeed, one Treasury Department official has remarked that
Article 16 and related proposals "were not aimed at providing U.S. com-
entity, subjecting it to the statutory withholding tax. The government of Guam has called for
the withdrawal of these provisions, arguing that they have placed it "at a marked disadvantage
in attracting foreign investment." 1983 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 10, at G-3 (Jan. 14, 1983).
Barbados. A previous treaty between the United States and Barbados, which was the result
of a 1959 extention of the then-existing treaty between the United States and the United King-
dom, was terminated by the United States, effective January 1, 1984. However, American and
Barbadian officials plan to formally open new income tax treaty talks during the week of Febru-
ary 13, 1984. The talks will take into account the model income tax treaties published by both
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the United States
Treasury, to the extent necessary to reflect Barbados' status as a development country. 1984
DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 7, at G-I1 (Jan. 12, 1984).
1"5 See 1982 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 169, at G-7 (Aug. 31, 1982).
116 Negotiators have expressed optimism that a renegotiated tax treaty between the two
countries will be completed in early 1984, thus continuing Netherlands Antilles access for U.S.
firms to the Eurobond market without the necessity of withholding tax. See 1983 DAILY TAX
REP. (BNA) No. 249, at G-I (Dec. 27., 1983).
117 1982 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 208, at G-3 (Nov. 27, 1982).
118 See 1982 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 218, at G-3 (Nov. 10, 1982).
119 See supra note 114 (discussion of British Virgin Islands treaty).
120 1982 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 218, at G-3 (Nov. 10, 1982).
121 1982 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 169, at G-3 (Aug. 31, 1982).
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panies with access to the Eurodollar market."' 22
A provision which would require the Netherlands Antilles to verify
the identities of foreign lenders receiving tax-free interest would lessen
the desirability of borrowing funds through the islands because the
bearer bond status of the debt obligations would effectively be negated.
Accordingly, irreparable harm to the Netherlands Antilles economy has
been predicted if the exchange of information provision sought by the
United States Treasury is included in the United States-Netherlands An-
tilles treaty.' 23 It should be clear that an IFS will choose as an incorpo-
ration site a location not subject to such an exchange of information
requirement if to do so will be in the best interests of its foreign bond-
holders. It is for this reason that the jurisdictions with existing tax trea-
ties with the United States have argued so strenuously against this type
of provision.
"Closing the Antilles window" could have a significant economic
impact within the United States as well. Netherlands Antilles officials
have understandably predicted severe consequences. 124 Possible conse-
quences could be as severe as bankruptcy for United States parent corpo-
rations unable to refinance the debt obligations of their IFSs either
quickly enough or on terms which are as advantageous. The more prob-
able result, however, is that affected United States parent corporations
will be forced to borrow in the domestic capital markets, thus incurring
greater costs. In addition, the flood of billions of dollars worth of bor-
rowing demand into capital markets in the United States will exert sig-
nificant upward pressure on domestic interest rates.
It is perhaps cognizance of the potential harm that may result that
keeps the current treaty negotiations moving forward. Negotiations with
other treaty countries that have broken down have resulted in termi-
nated treaties. The Treasury Department has, however, itself acknowl-
edged that the "Netherlands Antilles has come to play a special role in
international financial transactions."1 25 There may, then, be some valid-
ity to the "herd theory" as expressed by one recent commentator:
The notion is that, with billions in investment channeled through
the Antilles, the United States will not dare to "pull the plug" through
administrative action. Moreover, in a curious twist on normal negotiat-
ing postures, the size of "Antilles investment in the United States is
thought to represent leverage for the Antilles in treaty negotiations.
1 26
Perhaps this potential leverage will ensure a United States-Netherlands
Antilles tax treaty satisfactory to all concerned parties.
122 1982 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 95, at G-6 (May 17, 1982).
123 "Sources close to the current negotiations said the Antilles could lose about 3,000 jobs as
a result of the drop in business activities caused by the information exchange provision." 1982
DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 218, at G-3 (Nov. 10, 1982).
124 See Wall St. J., Oct. 11, 1982, at 1.
125 1980 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 119, at G-4 Uune 18, 1980).
126 Rosenbloom, US -Netherlands Antilles Negotiations; 9 TAX PLAN. INT'L 14, 16 (1982).
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VI. Conclusion
It may be true that "[t]he finance companies represent the only es-
cape from an unrealistic withholding tax on interest paid to nonresident
aliens."' 127 Government statistics revealed in 1979 that because of statu-
tory and treaty exemptions, the withholding tax netted only about
twenty-seven million dollars annually.1 2 8 When the magnitude of this
figure is compared to the costs incurred annually in order to avoid
the withholding tax, retention of the tax hardly seems economically
justifiable. 129
Retention of the tax may be justifiable, however, for non-economic
reasons. Arguments which have been made against the repeal of the
withholding tax include: (1) the only additional investment the United
States would attract from the repeal of the tax would derive from the
class of international tax avoiders who are not paying tax in their own
countries; (2) the unilateral elimination of the tax by the United States
would sacrifice important bargaining leverage in the negotiation of tax
treaties; and (3) repeal of the tax would favor foreign investors to the
relative detriment of United States investors.
13 0
The political difficulties associated with the repeal of this statutory
tax necessitate a fundamental policy analysis concerning the proper
United States position with regard to the international flow of funds via
tax treaties. If the United States truly desires an international economic
community characterized by the free flow of investment capital, this de-
sire should be reflected in the United States treaty network worldwide.
Assuming that the United States treaty network should be retained be-
cause of its beneficial impact upon international investment, it then be-
comes necessary to determine what treaty provisions are required to
create an equilibrium between all of the concerned parties to interna-
tional financial transactions.
The use of 1981 Model Income Tax Treaty Article 16 is inconsistent
with the free flow of international investment capital. Its provisions ef-
fectively negate the possibility of using an IFS financing arrangement of
the type contemplated by this paper in a jurisdiction where it is in force.
The Treasury's discussion draft Article 16, while imperfect, 31 ap-
pears to be a more finely tuned anti-treaty shopping provision. It would
127 Id. at 16.
128 See Lederman, supra note 4, at 87 n.4.
129 The Committee on U.S. Activities of Foreign Taxpayers of the Tax Section of the New
York Bar Association has issued a report supporting the complete elimination of U.S. withhold-
ing tax on interest and also proposing alternative limited exemptions. See Report of the Com-
mittee on U.S. Activities of Foreign Taxpayers on the Withholding of Tax on Interest Paid by
U.S. Borrowers to Foreign Lenders (Sept. 11, 1979), reprntedin SELECTED RECENT REPORTS OF
THE TAX SECnON OF THE N.Y. STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 257 (1979).
130 For futher discussion of these and other arguments, see Kingson, The Coherence ofInterna-
tional Taxation, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1151, 1283 (1981); S. SURREY, P. MCDANIEL, & J.
PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX REFORM OF 1976 139 (1976).
131 See Ruchelman and Imamura, supra note 113, at 3-5.
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deter treaty shopping while at the same time permitting a limited cate-
gory of IFSs to operate.
The most troublesome treaty provisions presently under discussion
are those which would require the country in which an IFS is located to
verify the residence of holders of obligations of IFSs. On its face, this
requirement seems simple and proper enough. But at what cost? On the
one hand, the United States Treasury has a legitimate desire to ensure
compliance with United States tax treaties. On the other hand, stifled
international investment and economic upheaval may result. The solu-
tion to this problem will be found only upon resolution of these two con-
flicting policy considerations.
